The consequences of peace.

With U.S.

and Iran talks underway and Israel sidelined in the process, we now know the answers to questions we asked 3 months ago.

Can a war launched together be ended together?

And is there a limit to U.S.-Israeli partnership?

Tonight, the reasons behind President Trump’s public tensions with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and what the U.S.

and Iran agreement says about America’s alliance with Israel, coming up on "Compass Points."

♪ Announcer: Support for "Compass Points" has been provided by... the Judy and Peter Blum Kovler Foundation, Camilla and George Smith, the Dorney Koppel Foundation, the Gruber Family Foundation, and Cap and Margaret Anne Eschenroeder.

The Judy and Peter Blum Kovler Foundation.

Upholding freedom by strengthening democracies at home and abroad.

Additional support is provided by Friends of the News Hour.

♪ Announcer: This program was made possible by contributions to your PBS station from viewers like you.

Thank you.

Once again, from the David M. Rubenstein Studio at WETA in Washington, moderator Nick Schifrin.

Hello and welcome to "Compass Points."

Just 4 months ago, the U.S.

and Israel launched a joint war with a level of military and political integration rarely seen in history.

But the U.S.

is now unilaterally negotiating a memorandum of understanding with Iran that Israeli officials have openly criticized.

The president and vice president have in turn publicly criticized Israel.

And the fighting in Lebanon between Israel and Hezbollah remains a major challenge that could undermine the deal.

So how fine is the line that Benjamin Netanyahu walks, as he’s viewed by critics as an impediment to peace?

And what does that tension say about the future of the U.S.-Israel alliance?

To discuss that, I’m joined in Tel Aviv by Michael Herzog.

He was, until last year, Israel’s ambassador to the United States, and is now a distinguished fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

And here with me in the studio, Danielle Pletka, distinguished senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and Aaron David Miller, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former senior State Department adviser in Republican and Democratic administrations on Arab-Israeli negotiations.

Thanks very much.

Welcome back.

Miller: Great to be here.

Schifrin: To "Compass Points."

Ambassador Herzog, I want to start with you.

Did the U.S.

treat Israel as an ally in this war, but is now not treating Israel as a partner in the peace?

Well, what we see is that while, as we are fighting Iran together, we’re very close and closely aligned.

And this type of war, of course, necessitates a high level of trust, coordination, and cooperation.

But when it comes to a diplomatic settlement or diplomatic outcome, we part ways.

And we don’t feel that the U.S.

considers Israel a partner to that, probably because they decided to opt out of the war, and they feel that the Israeli government would like to press on.

I must say that here in Israel, there’s widespread disappointment from the U.S.-Iran MOU, having fought together.

The Israeli expectation, I’m talking about general consensus here from right to left, it’s not only opposition and coalition, there’s no such division on Iran.

There was an expectation that the amazing military achievement we scored together would be translated into a strong, enduring diplomatic outcome focused on the nuclear issue.

And instead, we got a general MOU, which kicks the can down the road in terms of a solid nuclear arrangement.

And on top of that, it links the Lebanese and the Iranian theater, something that both Israel and Lebanon are opposed to.

Schifrin: And is it, do you think, the nature of the memorandum of understanding?

And I’ll list some of those specifics in a second.

Or also the fact that Netanyahu seems to have much less say in the conclusion of the war than he had in the beginning or the outcome, the conduct of the war itself.

That is true.

I don’t think he was party to shaping the MOU.

I mean, he had many conversations with President Trump, expressed his opinion, but ultimately the U.S.

went its own way.

And what I understand is that Israel was not really consulted on that, was quite surprised and disappointed by the outcome.

Schifrin: Danny, is that right?

Was Israel not really consulted about the outcome and was surprised by it?

Pletka: Oh, yeah.

I find absolutely nothing to disagree with in anything Ambassador Herzog said.

This was a decision that was made very much in Trump world.

And when I say Trump world, I mean in the very, very tiny, tiny circle that is the president and his main advisors.

To the extent that countries like Qatar, the UAE and others were involved, they were more involved as kibitzers, if I can use that diplomatic term.

They were the peanut gallery that was influencing the people who are talking to the president.

They were not being asked, "Is this OK?

"Do you have concerns?

"Is there a different outcome?

"Should we be doing this?

What have we missed?

"What are you most worried about?

None of those conversations were happening.

Schifrin: Aaron, should we be surprised that the president of the United States decided to end the war the way he wanted to end the war?

Miller: No, because in a war of choice without clearly articulated objectives and no sense of correlating the means at our disposal to achieve those objectives, underestimating an adversary, a brutal authoritarian repressive regime that has weaponized geography, now made the Straits their new nuclear weapon.

I think it was inevitable.

I think Danny’s right.

And it’s great to be here with Mike and you, Nick.

That divergence, not just in tactics and strategy, was implicit almost from the beginning of the war.

And it does not surprise in the least that this president, transactional, cares about Israel but cares more about Donald Trump and how it all is going to look and be perceived.

That’s why I think we are where we are.

And let’s put an underline on this difference between the beginning of the war and where we are today.

Take a listen to how Netanyahu described the U.S.-Israeli relationship in mid-March, just a few weeks into the war, and then how President Trump described Netanyahu just last week.

Interpreter: We are now a mighty power, almost global, together with our ally, who is the global superpower, fighting shoulder to shoulder.

Trump: We’re the big partner, and he’s the very small partner.

Ambassador Herzog, how do you reconcile those two statements?

What happened between March and now?

Well, as I said, the two parties parted way when it came, when the U.S.

decided to end the war on these terms.

And the feeling was that it wouldn’t satisfy Israel and that Israel wanted to push on.

And so here we are, witnessing some tensions.

I think the tensions today are focused on Lebanon.

The very fact that the Trump administration decided to link the Iranian and Lebanese theater is a very big challenge to Israel, because since the Trump administration announced a ceasefire in Lebanon, we lost many soldiers, not only in Lebanon, but also in Israel itself, from drones, from rockets, other military instruments.

And the feeling is that there’s only fire, no ceasefire, and that we should have prioritized that the direction in Lebanon should be decided in negotiations between the Israeli and Lebanese governments, not in negotiations between the U.S.

and Iranian governments.

Iran has no role to play in Lebanon as far as we are concerned, as far as the Lebanese are concerned.

This injected a lot of tension.

And so one thing that Israel did was hold its fire, save for, you know, incidents where when you have to, you need self-defense.

But other than that, we’re not proactive.

And now the Iranians are trying to frame the debate around the Israeli deployment in southern Lebanon.

Namely, they’re saying "We will not sign "the ultimate deal "unless Israel withdraws from southern Lebanon."

This, if the U.S.

adopts this position, it puts Mr.

Netanyahu in an impossible position.

He has to decide between his own political base and we are headed to elections, and between his relations with President Trump.

Schifrin: I think that’s a key question.

I think... And also, it’s not only Lebanon, although that’s obviously one of the flashpoints.

The Iranian regime has already received permission to sell oil in dollars.

That’s $300 billion in the long run, at least, for a reconstruction fund.

We’ll see if that actually happens.

The deal does not address Iranian missiles or proxies.

And when it comes to Ambassador Herzog’s point about Lebanon, listen to how President Trump describes Israel’s actions in Lebanon.

Too many people are being killed.

And you don’t have to knock down an apartment house every time you’re looking for somebody.

Because there are a lot of people in those apartment houses, and they’re not all Hezbollah.

Aaron, how does Netanyahu address these issues, address Lebanon, without alienating Donald Trump?

I mean, I think he’s navigating a very fine line between a domestic constituency.

Forget his own government for a minute.

Just imagine a million residents of northern Israel in the border communities.

They feel betrayed that he exposed them by beginning this war.

They feel betrayed by the fact that the IDF is now constrained.

I think you have 36 Israelis killed.

Israeli soldiers since March.

Iran is using, as well as using fiber optic drones.

The Israelis don’t have an answer.

They also have no military solution.

This is, in essence, it seems to me, the problem.

So on one hand, he’s navigating the domestic constraints and then trying to keep the president happy.

I think they’ve found a way to manage this, maybe, by not pushing for Israeli withdrawal.

And if the Iranians aren’t careful, they’ll overplay their hand, because they are using Lebanon, I think, to drive a wedge between the U.S.

and Israel and to create a zone of immunity for Hezbollah.

Schifrin: And, Danny, I saw you shaking your head about missiles, especially, right?

President Trump started the war saying that he was going to decimate Iranian missiles.

Now apparently, let’s listen again, he believes they’re going to be OK.

Guys, I like some of these guys.

But I don’t think they’re smart.

"Sir, you shouldn’t let them have any missile."

I said, "Well, what am I going to do?

"Am I going to let Saudi Arabia have missiles, "but they can’t have them?"

"Yes, sir."

It doesn’t work that way, you know?

It doesn’t work that way.

And missiles aren’t the problem.

Missiles, they hurt a little location, but they don’t blow up the planet.

Danny, missiles aren’t the problem.

I mean, Iran fired more than 600 missiles at Israel during this war.

Pletka: Look, let me contextualize this.

I think we know this, but let’s contextualize this for your viewers.

Donald Trump is a businessman from New York and a very successful entrepreneur and a very, a very market-sensitive politician.

He has a real feral sense for sort of the public pulse.

And I give him a lot of credit for that.

In terms of national security policy, it’s not just that he has no vision.

There’s nothing there, right?

There’s nothing, there’s nothing there.

And we all understand what happens when there’s nothing there.

Nature abhors a vacuum.

National security experts abhor a vacuum.

He is getting advised by different people who have different agendas.

And when this conflict started, he was listening to one group of people.

Throughout the course of the conflict, that changed.

And then as the conflict did not turn out exactly as he had wanted, and I always find the best analogy for me, excuse me, to 14-year-old boys, is that I think of him like that, right?

"I went over to my friend’s house, "and we were supposed to do X, and they didn’t do it.

"And, mom, I am never talking to him again," right?

That’s how you need to think of the president.

Then he adjusted to the people who he wanted to hear from.

And now he’s listening to other people.

And so if you look at the trajectory, what you see is at the beginning, he was listening to his friends in Israel, friends who are supporters of a strong American posture towards Iran, people like not me, but people like me.

And as this changed, he is now listening to Steve Witkoff, Tom Barrack, and Jared Kushner.

And I can explain why people always say, "Oh, Jared Kushner, he’s Jewish.

He must support Israel."

No.

But in any case, he is now listening, and he is using Iran’s talking points.

These are Iran’s talking points.

And we should be very, very overt about it.

And by the way, not letting you get a word in there twice, Nick.

Schifrin: It’s all right.

- By the way, the MOU looks like it was written by, and I believe certainly was drafted by, the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Miller: Can I just add a point?

I mean, I think this last point that Danny made is absolutely correct.

I mean, I’ve been around negotiations for a while.

We had very bad lawyers and very bad negotiators.

The fact that Article I, the first, like Article I of our Constitution talks about Congress as the most important branch.

Uh-huh.

Article I mentions Lebanon 3 times.

I mean... Schifrin: It’s the very first sentence.

Miller: Who negotiated this on our side?

The president’s son-in-law and his best friend.

You can’t run the railroad of national security like that.

Schifrin: But let’s get to brass tacks here.

Let’s get to a question of where does this actually lead policy-wise?

Where does this lead the U.S.

and Israel?

And of course, part of the relationship between the two men is, shall we say, rhetorical flourishes that come out of the president of the United States.

Bibi’s aides tell me he’s gotten used to these.

But nonetheless, let me just highlight one.

In their new book, New York Times reporters, Maggie Haberman and Jonathan Swan, say on one call, President of the United States Donald Trump told Netanyahu, "All the Jews are sick of you.

"Even the two Jews on this call are sick of you."

That was a reference to Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner.

And I just want to be clear here.

I am quoting a book.

[Laughter] The president has told Fox’s Trey Yingst, Axios’ Barak Ravid.

Bibi has, quote, "No effing judgment.

"What the eff are you doing?

"You’re effing crazy."

Now, we know Trump is not the first cursor in chief.

Let’s be honest.

Right.

But, Aaron, has any American president ever talked to or about an Israeli prime minister?

Miller: No.

I mean, a thousand times no.

I mean, Jimmy Carter.

I worked with Jimmy Carter to Bush 43.

You could throw in Obama and Biden.

The answer is no.

No, no American president or vice president, for that matter, has ever talked about an Israeli prime minister the way they have.

And no American president has ever willfully leaked the contents of his private phone conversations.

Schifrin: Some of it’s on the record.

Miller: Right.

Pletka: That wasn’t him leaking that?

Miller: Right.

Pletka: I hate to admit it.

Schifrin: No, but the president has confirmed some of this himself.

And for Trump, I think it works.

But we’re a far cry from that to what, to me, is more important.

And that is, will the administration impose any costs or consequences?

That’s a critically important question.

Pletka: On Iran?

Miller: Well, on Iran, you know the story on Israel.

Right.

Will the U.S.

actually impose consequences policy-wise?

Miller: My answer is no.

They’re not going to restrict your military assistance.

They’re not going to stop intelligence sharing.

They’re not going to stop research and development.

They’re not going to stop discussions over an MOU for the next 10 years.

They’re not going to adopt their own security council resolutions, critical Israel, or vote for someone else’s.

They’re not going to do any of that, in my judgment.

Schifrin: Hmm.

Yeah.

Danny, you’re not convinced?

Pletka: I think that we can persuade ourselves that a lot of this is, you know, Sturm und Drang.

It’s just signifying nothing.

Sound and fury.

Sorry to Shakespeare.

Signifying nothing.

But I think that masks the fact that we are at an inflection point in American relations with Israel.

And just to bring it back to Lebanon for a second, and then we can talk about American politics if you want to, Nick.

But on the question of Lebanon, as I watch these negotiations and I watch poor President Aoun of Lebanon, who’s one of the first in recent years to actually have the guts to want to do something about Hezbollah.

Schifrin: And take on Hezbollah rhetorically, publicly, and privately.

Pletka: So what I see in the Middle East is that it is a block of the president of Lebanon, the Emiratis, a couple of other Arab states, and Israel, who arranged and don’t trust the United States now.

Because it wasn’t just Bibi Netanyahu that Donald Trump was undercutting when he talked about Lebanon.

He was also undercutting the president of Lebanon, who had said Hezbollah has no place in his country.

Schifrin: Ambassador Herzog, bring us back to Netanyahu and the president of the United States.

We’ve played all the rhetoric.

You heard Aaron’s point, right?

Well, it won’t translate to policy.

But for Netanyahu, he’s facing an election, as you pointed out.

His aides tell me for the first time they really do believe they’re not sure they’re going to win.

How politically perilous is this for Bibi to have the president of the United States saying what he’s saying and doing what he’s doing?

Look, it’s evident that there are a lot of tensions between President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu.

And it’s also clear that President Trump speaks in a way that no other president has spoken.

I’ve been on calls between presidents in the U.S.

and prime ministers in Israel.

It’s Trump.

You know, he’s very different and unique in this sense.

But I think that first, the U.S.-Israel relations are bigger than those two personalities.

And I mean, we just fought shoulder to shoulder together in a way no other two nations could have done.

And we still have many other things going for us together.

But what I want to say policy-wise is that the U.S.-Iran MOU is at odds not only with Israel, but also with other regional actors.

As Danielle noted correctly, there’s an agreement between Israel and Lebanon that the focus should be on disarming Hezbollah.

We just started negotiations between our two governments recently.

And in those negotiations, we announced together with the United States that the starting point should be the redeployment of Hezbollah south of the Litani River and the disarmament of Hezbollah.

The MOU contradicts that.

And I think the way for Israel to navigate today for Prime Minister Netanyahu is to accelerate negotiations with Lebanon and create a roadmap which will include Israeli redeployment in southern Lebanon as against the deployment of Lebanese armed forces in certain areas.

That’s a way to go about it and not act under an Iranian dictate.

You also asked about missiles.

So when it comes to missiles, of course, this is a major Israeli concern because it’s one of the reasons we initiated the war, because their missile arsenal was reaching a very, very dangerous level, a strategic threat to Israel.

But during that war, Iran fired at the UAE and other Gulf countries no less rockets and missiles than it fired at Israel.

And now they are concerned.

And they issued a statement saying any future deal with Iran should include limitations on their ballistic missiles.

So the problem is not only with Israel.

Schifrin: It’s a regional problem.

It’s a regional concern for sure.

Danny, you asked if I wanted to do U.S.

domestic politics.

I do for the last few minutes.

I want to turn to Vice President Vance.

He’s leading the negotiations with Iran, of course.

And let’s listen to his warning, his warning to what he called Israeli critics of the memorandum of understanding.

If I was in the cabinet of the Israeli government, I might not be attacking the only powerful ally that I have anywhere left in the entire world.

Vice President Vance added Israel had to, quote, "smell the reality of the situation the country is in."

Does his warning resonate?

And what does it say that Vance is saying this ahead of what is presumably a presidential run?

Pletka: So my theory of the game is that, and certainly I don’t see anything to refute that, is that Vice President Vance didn’t agree with the war.

A lot of the leaking that we saw, both to Maggie Haberman and John Swan, but also to others, has come from Vance.

And I know that.

And he wants everybody to know that he opposed it.

He also wants everybody to understand, one leak from the Situation Room, that Bibi Netanyahu was the one who was encouraging the United States to join them in this war.

He is positioning himself to say, "Well, of course I supported my president, "because I supported my president.

"But we needed to get out.

"We wanted to get out.

"And the Israelis, the Jews, wouldn’t let us do it.

"And that’s where I had to come on strong, "because everything that went wrong here "is the fault of Israel pushing us too hard."

That’s how he squares the circle for himself moving forward into 2028 and gets back into the good graces of the fringes of the Republican Party that Donald Trump has repudiated.

Schifrin: And so, Aaron, if that is the case, what is next for Israel?

Right?

Because, and I just want to add this, right, we saw this week Democratic candidates in New York who are overtly critical of Israel win the Democratic primary.

So what does the future look like?

What’s next for Israel and U.S.

relations if Israel is becoming partisan?

And Netanyahu, at least, is being sidelined.

Miller: Yeah, look, there are 3 foundational elements of this relationship.

Value affinity, right?

We share common values.

And clearly we’re both backsliding on this.

A high coincidence of interest, no strict down the line, but a high.

And then finally, a strong bipartisan basis of domestic support.

I have never seen in my time these foundations under more stress than they are now.

Israel is in a dangerous neighborhood, but it has demonstrated a degree of escalation, dominance and military power that is extraordinary.

Nonetheless, Israel has become Goliath.

It’s no longer viewed as David, and large parts of the Democratic Party and increasing numbers of Republicans.

But we only have one president at a time.

So what I’ll be looking for between now and October, it’s whether or not Donald Trump sets up, reelect Benjamin Netanyahu campaign headquarters in Washington.

That to me is the test, at least for now.

Schifrin: For now, absolutely.

Aaron David Miller, Danny Pletka, Ambassador Mike Herzog, thank you very much.

Really appreciate all of you being here.

And that is all the time we have for now.

Thank you at home for joining us.

I’m Nick Schifrin.

We’ll see you here again next week on "Compass Points."

Announcer: Support for "Compass Points" has been provided by... the Judy and Peter Blum Kovler Foundation, Camilla and George Smith, the Dorney Koppel Foundation, the Gruber Family Foundation, and Cap and Margaret Anne Eschenroeder.

The Judy and Peter Blum Kovler Foundation.

Upholding freedom by strengthening democracies at home and abroad.

Additional support is provided by Friends of the News Hour.

♪ Announcer: This program was made possible by contributions to your PBS station from viewers like you.

Thank you.

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